



ePIsodIC And non-ePIsodIC 
IntentIonAlIty: on tHe ConstItUtIVe 
fUnCtIon of tHe ePIstemIC HABItUAlItIes 




intentionality, habituality, horizon, knowledge, testimony
husserl introduced empty intentions into the framework of static phenomenology in 
order to render intelligible the fact that we are conscious of whole things in perception 
despite the fact that they are always presented to us only from one side and we don’t have 
any imaginative or symbolic representation of all their unseen properties. The article 
shows that this conception of empty intention is a misconception and that the emptiness 
that is constitutive for the givenness of whole things in perception is due not to empty 
intentions but to intentional habitualities, especially to habitual beliefs. These beliefs 
make up the empty horizons through which we have consciousness of whole things and 
of the world as a whole. This solution is offered by husserl in the framework of his genetic 
phenomenology. referring to some of husserl’s genetic pronouncements, the article 
investigates the constitutive role of two forms of habitual beliefs: beliefs which stem from 
one’s own experiences and insights and beliefs that stem from other’s experiences or 
insights and are taken over in good faith. Special attention is paid to this second form of 
habitual beliefs for the constitution of the world; it is argued that the world-horizon is 
basically made up of habitual beliefs of this second form. 
*This essay is an enlarged and improved version of a lecture delivered under a similar title at the “husserl-arbeitstage” 
in Cologne in 2011. elizabeth a. Behnke has translated the german original, which is forthcoming in the Polish journal 
fenomenologia 12 (2014) under the title “episodische und nicht-episodische intentionalität. Zur konstitutiven funktion 
der epistemischen habitualitäten des Wissens und glaubens bei edmund husserl.”
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Proceeding from the descriptive analysis of acts (i.e., of 
intentional lived experiences of which we are prereflectively 
aware) and oriented toward act-intentionality as the prototype 
of any intentionality whatever, husserl described, within the 
framework of static phenomenology, certain act-moments 
that are indeed intentional, but are not act-moments of which 
we are prereflectively aware; under the headings of “empty 
intention” and “meaning (or intending) more” he assimilates 
the intentionality of these act-moments to the intentionality 
of acts and describes them as pertaining to the phenomena 
of consciousness. i would like to show that assimilating these 
moments under those headings is inadequate and that broadening 
the notions of “meaning” and “intention” to include something 
that is not itself a phenomenon of consciousness, that is not an 
act-like meaning or intending, is misleading and superfluous: it 
is misleading because it leads the reflective glance in the wrong 
direction, and it is superfluous because with familiar habitualities 
of knowledge and belief we have forms of intentionality that 
cannot be addressed as forms of act-intentionality, yet play the 
very same role in the constitution of things and of the world that 
husserl ascribed to empty intention and meaning-more. what 
husserl was trying to describe “statically,” using the resources 
of a broadened vocabulary of “consciousness,” as something that 
is act-like and is thus a type of conscious performance turns out 
“genetically” to be a performance of non-conscious habitualities 
whose intentionality is to be characterized as non-episodic 
intentionality, in contrast to the episodic intentionality of acts.1 
Using the example of thing-constitution, i will show in the first 
part of the present essay that a distinction must be made between 
episodic and non-episodic intentionality, and that something 
like thing-perception is only possible through their functioning 
1  what i am calling “episodic intentionality” in this essay corresponds quite precisely to the 
form of intentionality that Uwe meixner called “classical intentionality” or “Brentano-husserlian 
intentionality” and highlighted as “the core form of intentionality” in contrast to functionalistic 
and representationalist conceptions of intentionality—see Uwe Meixner (2006), as well as 
meixner (2014), especially chapter iii, “on intending,” pp. 247–360. This form of intentionality 
determines the thematic and methodic framework of Brentano’s descriptive psychology of “psychic 
phenomena” and of husserl’s earlier phenomenology of intentional lived experiences.
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together.2 in the second, considerably shorter part of this essay, 
i will show that what holds good for the constitution of things in 
perception holds good all the more and to an even greater extent 
for the intentional constitution of the world. like the intentional 
constitution of things, the intentional constitution of the world 
remains incomprehensible without taking into account the 
constitutive function of the epistemic habitualities of knowledge 
and belief: it is essentially due to the intentional horizon-forming 
performance of these habitualities that we have existing things 
and an existing world given through empty inner and outer 
horizons.
1.1 The Original Visual Concept of Horizon and the Phenomenological 
Concept of Horizon
when we visually perceive such things as houses or tables, we 
always perceive the whole thing, even though we always only 
“genuinely” see sides of things. we don’t merely perceive the front 
side that is intuitively presented to us; instead, we perceive the 
whole thing: what we refer to perceptually is the thing as a whole, 
appearing from the front side. it is just this reference to the whole 
thing that is expressed in everyday language when, for example, 
we are looking at the house in front of us and say, “This house has 
been empty for years.” The thing intended to in the perception is 
the entire physical thing as such standing there before us in person 
[leibhaftig], even if it is always seen from a particular angle and 
thus always appears only “one-sidedly.” This is precisely what is 
peculiar to thing-perception, and is what distinguishes it from 
both pictorial presentations and descriptions in which a thing 
existing contemporaneously elsewhere is presentified—namely, 
in thing-perception, the thing itself is not only given as present 
now, but also as being there in person.3 yet all that is “genuinely” 
perceived at any given time—perceived in the narrow sense of 
what is immediately present purely visually—is the side of the 
visually appearing thing that is currently facing us, the side we 
2  what will be shown in what follows about acts of thing-perception holds good mutatis 
mutandis for any act whatever. All analyses of specific types of acts remain incomplete if 
habitualities and their constitutive function are not taken into consideration.
3  The latter is the case when, e.g., i am standing in front of the eiffel Tower in Paris and am 
looking at this landmark itself; if i am looking at a photograph of it or reading a description of it 
in a travel guide, it is not given in person, but is merely pictorially or symbolically presentified. 
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could reproduce with the aid of photography or film. In order to 
make the fact that the perceived thing is given in person as a whole 
comprehensible in light of the fact that the seen thing necessarily 
appears from one side, husserl introduces the phenomenological 
concept of horizon, or more precisely, of inner horizon. 
husserl’s phenomenological concept of horizon can be explained 
as follows by taking an analysis of the original visual concept of the 
horizon as a point of departure. a horizon in the original visual 
sense is a limited sphere of view, relative to the standpoint of 
the beholder, within which things appear; it moves along with 
the beholder, and because it shifts in this way it has a movable 
boundary line that points (in more or less determinate fashion) 
toward what is potentially visible beyond the boundary line of the 
sphere of view. (For instance, at sea the horizon line is a movable 
boundary line of the sphere of view that points toward further, 
unlimited stretches of open ocean, or else toward sea bounded by 
shore, and our expectations of the one or the other can be more or 
less determinate, depending on how much we currently know about 
our nautical position.) Since a horizon or sphere of view is always 
only a sphere of view relative to a current standpoint, any talk of 
horizons is subjective from the start, always also implicitly including 
the subject in any given case, along with this subject’s movable 
standpoint. and it is this relativity to the subject that makes 
the concept of horizon a concept suitable for phenomenological 
descriptions, since in such descriptions the appearing (more 
generally: what one is conscious of) is always thematized in its 
relation to the subjectivity for whom something appears (more 
generally: for whom something is consciously given).
husserl’s specifically phenomenological concept of horizon does 
include the components of subject-relativity, delimitedness, and 
movability (components drawn from the original visual concept 
of the horizon), but these components receive another, non-visual 
sense: the components of the visual horizon become components 
of a horizon of acceptance [geltungshorizont]. The subject-relative, 
delimited, and movable field of view of the visible becomes a 
movable sphere (a sphere that is therefore open, even though 
delimited) of what currently holds good [gilt] for the subject, 
and in a double way. on the one hand, it includes acceptances 
[geltendes] that are currently actually holding good within the 
current lived experiences of intentional consciousness; on the 
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other hand, it includes acceptances that habitually hold good 
(or better, are in co-acceptance [mit-geltung]), especially with 
regard to fixed convictions in which what holds good for us with 
the sense “existing” or “real” remains in abiding acceptance, 
comprising, in its totality, what is suggested in the expression 
“background knowledge.” This specifically phenomenological 
concept of horizon—which is indispensable for what follows—
can be seen in a manuscript that husserl wrote around 1933 
or 1934. here what he has in view is the horizon-phenomenon, 
“world holding good for me [mir geltende Welt]),” and he uses 
the perceptual field and the visual concept of the horizon as 
the point of departure from which to determine the genuinely 
phenomenological concept of horizon:
The world holding good for me extends beyond the perceptual 
field; it has its non-perceptual horizon; [what i have] apart 
from the latter [is] the perceptual field in its oriented mode of 
givenness within which all the objects simultaneously perceived 
in it (the perceptually coexisting objects) have their modes of 
adumbration as near and far and <within which> a sphere of the 
outermost still-perceivable distance can be distinguished. This 
[concept of horizon] [...] in the stratum of visual perception [...] is 
even the original concept of “horizon.” of course, the latter word is 
used ambiguously. It also refers to the entire visual field—to the 
totality of that which lies within the sphere of the horizon. in 
phenomenology, [however,] we use the word to designate that which 
holds good beyond the perceptual field, and then further for all similar 
cases (fields of memory, etc.). (hua XXXiX, p. 333f.)4    
This characterization of the horizon as what holds good beyond 
the perceptual field (and similar fields of what is intentionally 
meant) makes it clear that horizon in the specifically 
phenomenological sense is not something like a background 
that we are unthematically aware of co-appearing along with 
the object that we are currently thematically aware of, i.e., the 
perceptually appearing object standing in the foreground. To 
equate the “horizon” of consciousness with its “background” 
4  Below i will show how the horizon-concept in this passage compares with another 
horizon-concept husserl uses elsewhere (horizon as the “induction that essentially belongs to 
each experience and is inseparable from each experience itself”—see the second passage from 
experience and Judgment cited in section 1.2 below).
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is to confuse the much more impoverished static concept of 
the background (which has its original place in the distinction 
between a salient visual form in the foreground and a visually co-
appearing background) with husserl’s richer, dynamic horizon-
concept, whose main characteristic is that what horizonally holds 
good—or better, what is co-accepted—does not and must not appear: 
it can neither co-appear on the perceptually appearing object as 
a determination of it, nor can it appear within the perceptually 
co-appearing background. what is decisive is that what lies in 
the horizon and belongs to it as a component is merely co-accepted 
[gilt mit] in what appears, and as co-accepted, determines the sense 
with which the appearing appears. and within this total sphere 
of what holds good for me at any given moment, what currently 
thematically holds good for me—e.g., the thing holding good for 
me as currently actually perceived and as determined in such and 
such a way—is merely a small (albeit central) sector of a whole 
consisting of everything i have in acceptance in a given living 
present, including everything that “exists” (in the broadest sense) 
“for me” at all, part of which i am thematically aware of and part 
of which is unthematic or entirely out of awareness.
husserl gives the following answer to the question of how a real 
thing is constituted for us in perception as there in person as a 
whole, how the sense “real thing” is built up in perception: it is 
by way of an inner horizon, i.e., through the intentions that form 
this horizon and that intend beyond what is “genuinely” perceived. 
in experience and Judgment (a work edited by ludwig landgrebe 
and published posthumously in 1939), husserl characterizes the 
concept of inner horizon with reference to a concept of horizon 
that is essentially different from the one discussed above:
each real item arising in experience as something new stands 
within the world-horizon and thus has its inner horizon. it is 
known in thematic perception by continually being presented 
as itself there, while at the same time being explicated in its 
individual features, its “what”-moments, during the stretch of 
experiencing [...]. For their part, these features too are known as 
presenting themselves, but precisely with the sense of features 
through which the real item is displayed as what it is. [...] 
everything that shows itself in this way, and is already implicitly 
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there even before the explication of what is perceived, essentially 
holds good as that which is genuinely perceived of the real item in 
this perception. [The real item] itself is more than what currently 
comes to actual cognizance or has already come to cognizance: it 
has the sense that its “inner horizon” constantly imparts to it; the seen 
side is only a side to the extent that it [reading “es,” not “sie”] has 
unseen sides that are anticipated in a way that determines the 
sense. (husserl 1976, §8, pp. 30f./35; emphasis altered)5
husserl explains the general guiding concept of horizon as 
follows:
“horizon” thereby means the induction that essentially belongs to 
each experience and is inseparable from each experience itself. 
[...] This originary “induction” or anticipation turns out to be [...] 
a mode of “intentionality”—precisely the mode that anticipatorily 
intends beyond a core of givenness [...]. (husserl 1976, §8, p. 28/32f.]; 
cf. hua XXXiX, p. 137)6
Both the characterization given here of the inner horizon as 
concerning the possibility of explicating the thing’s being-thus7 
and the general characterization of the horizon-concept that this 
5  Passages from husserl (1976) quoted in the present essay have been newly translated, but for the 
convenience of the reader, page references will also be provided to the published english translation, 
husserl (1973).  drummond (1990) emphasizes the sense-bestowing function of the horizon in many 
places, e.g., p. 213: “The horizon, then, by virtue of the noematic senses it correlates with the present 
noematic sense, contributes to the concrete sense the object has for us [...]”; cf. p. 226. drummond’s 
thesis of the primacy of the act-horizon such that “references from noema to noema [...] are possible 
only because the acts of which these noemata are the correlates are intentionally united” (p. 216) 
rests, in my opinion, on a construction; what can be brought to light descriptively is rather the 
contrary: noemata intentionally unified as horizons. At best one can only speak of act-horizons with 
reference to the extremely narrow compass of the horizons comprising the temporal “window” of the 
living present, i.e., horizons in which an act is constituted in retention and protention. The horizons 
lying beyond this are horizons of habitualities, or rather, horizons of habitually accepted noematic 
contents that are “sense-determining” for the currently explicit noematic sense.
6  here it must be left open to what extent landgrebe’s edited text for the introduction 
to husserl (1976), and especially the text most relevant for the present essay (§8), actually 
corresponds to husserl’s intentions. This can only be settled by having the original version of 
all of the husserl manuscripts landgrebe used in composing the introduction at one’s disposal 
in order to be able to judge whether landgrebe’s arrangement and combination of portions of 
text drawn from these manuscripts is in fact justified. A helpful synopsis of manuscripts used for 
most of the main text of this work is provided in lohmar (1996). Unfortunately, no such synopsis 
is available for the introduction. meanwhile, however, we can point to the publication of at least 
two of husserl’s original texts from 1934, portions of which landgrebe incorporated into the 
introduction (see hua XXXiX, Beilage Viii, Text nr. 15); these permit us to read the passages he 
drew upon in their original context.
7  “hence the inner horizons concern concrete objects in their substrate-structure; they are 
the horizons of what is to be explicated, of the being-thus” (hua XXXiX, p. 104).
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entails have weaknesses. 
one weakness lies in falsely equating the horizonal “intending 
beyond” with an “anticipating,” i.e., with the anticipation of 
something temporally subsequent. That to equate these is false 
follows from a fact that can be brought to light in reflection, 
namely, that determinations (qualities or parts) that are ascribed 
to the thing, through the “intending-beyond” perception, 
as belonging to the thing right now are not anticipated, i.e., 
anticipated as something future, but are appresented, i.e., posited 
as something co-present. as co-present thing-determinations, 
the horizonally intended determinations are present, just as the 
entire thing intended is (as well as what is currently “genuinely” 
perceived of it). at best, what could be anticipated is its future 
givenness in future acts of “genuine” perception. The horizon-
intentionality characteristic of inner horizons, an intentionality 
that posits co-present thing-determinations as co-present 
“implicitly,” is accordingly not anticipating, but appresenting.
a second weakness of the above characterizations of the concepts 
of horizon and inner horizon arises because what is appresented 
or posited as co-present are not sides or views of the thing relative 
to the subject, but objective thing-determinations such as, for 
instance, the shape and color of the facade of a house i am seeing 
from the back side, or of its inside, which is hidden from me at 
the moment. These objective thing-determinations, which would 
become visible if i were to enter the house or go around to the 
front side, are the thing-determinations that are co-intended, 
and co-posited as present, in horizonal intending-beyond. The 
formula for the constitution of things by means of inner horizons 
accordingly reads: presentation through appresentation.8 This 
solution of the problem of the in-person givenness of perceptual 
things as a whole can also be found in husserl. in a text from 
the 1930s with the title “appresentation and presentation with 
respect to individual things and with respect to the whole world,” 
8  cf. the following related formulation found in hua XXXiX, Text nr. 15: “now perception 
as perception of the thing, of this thing, is perception through apperception, through horizonal 
co-acceptance [horizontmitgeltung] as determining the ontic sense. This co-acceptance is 
‘indeterminately general.’ itself-appearing is appearing as determined. what is anticipated in an 
‘indeterminate’ manner, in a vague, equivocal, ‘general’ way, is what would appear in a possible 
[vermöglich] continuation of the perception, in a synthetic itself-appearing and as something 
that itself appears” (p. 141, emphasis added). [The last two sentences of the german original: 
“Sich selbst zeigen ist sich bestimmt zeigen. antizipiert ist in ‘unbestimmter’ weise, in vager, 
vieldeutiger, ‘allgemeiner’ weise: sich in vermöglicher Fortführung der wahrnehmung selbst 
Zeigendes in einem synthetischen Sich-selbst-Zeigen und <sich> selbst Zeigenden.”]
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he writes: “each perception of something transcendent can only 
present its transcendent object by means of appresentation” 
(hua XXXiX, p. 142). and since husserl also characterizes the 
appresenting inner horizon that is functioning constitutively here 
as a so-called empty horizon, he can say in the same text: “insofar 
as [...] [empty horizons] are essential for thing-perception, and 
insofar as a thing can only be present in person at all through their 
help, they make present [sind sie gegenwärtigend] rather than merely 
presentifying [vergegenwärtigend]” (hua XXXiX, p. 142).  
what exactly are these empty horizons? and how is the horizon-
intentionality that forms them and functions in them to be 
characterized? husserl speaks of empty intentions as having 
the function of appresenting. But what are these appresenting 
empty intentions? are they merely acts of a particular type? are 
they latent acts co-performed alongside other acts? or are they 
moments of acts, non-selfsufficient parts of acts that themselves 
have nothing act-like about them? in what does the peculiar 
constitutive performance of empty horizons consist, and how can 
we make this performance comprehensible?
within the empty intentions forming the horizons of thing-
perceptions, something would be emptily intended insofar as 
what is “horizonally” intended, and is thereby co-accepted in the 
objective sense (e.g., the inside of a house i’m familiar with and am 
perceiving from the outside), is not presentified intuitively. as a rule, 
no matter what side i am seeing the house from, no phantasy or 
memory images of its interior hover before me. husserl emphasizes 
the non-intuitiveness of what is horizonally co-intended when he writes 
of thing-experience as follows: 
its experiencing intending has an open horizon of possible experiences 
of the same thing in which whatever is not yet genuinely given would 
come to genuine givenness. They are not experiences that actually 
hover before me in advance as intuitively presentified, or even as 
particular individual experiences of any sort. it is nevertheless a 
horizon of consciousness, a mode <of> implicitly intending beyond 
what is genuinely experienced. This is a “vague,” “non-intuitive” mode 
such that the sense intended in this intending-beyond is brought 
to demonstrative display in specific actual or possible [vermöglich]  
experiences, whether they are able to be freely <generated> or 
occur on their own; this [demonstrative display] is accompanied by 
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the evidence that [these experiences] were encompassed in the 
indeterminate generality [of that horizon of consciousness] in a 
peculiar way, i.e., vaguely, non-intuitively, indistinctly, yet co-
intended. (hua XXXiX, p. 112)
in the Cartesian meditations, husserl characterizes what is 
implicitly horizonally co-intended beyond what is genuinely 
experienced as “what is included and only non-intuitively co-
intended in the sense of the cogitatum” (hua i, §20, p. 85).9 
The non-intuitiveness of what is horizonally co-intended and 
included in the sense of the cogitatum—a non-intuitiveness that 
Husserl emphasized—is also not offset by a symbolic reference, a 
symbolic intending-beyond, through linguistic or non-linguistic 
signs establishing a symbolic relation to what is not “genuinely” 
perceived of the thing (e.g., the inside of a house seen from the 
outside), since both of these types of signs are usually lacking 
in my perceptual consciousness. and in any case, no sort of 
symbolic consciousness of what is not genuinely perceived of 
the thing can be descriptively brought to light in reflection on 
normal prelinguistic thing-perception. But if the appresenting 
empty intentions consist neither in intuitive nor in symbolic 
presentifications of what is co-present, how is their performance 
to be understood, namely, the performance of appresenting 
something as determinate as, e.g., the familiar interior of a 
familiar house and not appresenting something completely 
indeterminate instead? For if all that was appresented was 
something completely indeterminate, with only the “genuinely” 
seen side of the house determined, then there would be no 
perception of a house as a concrete physical thing, and certainly 
no perception of it as a familiar individual material thing with a 
familiar interior. 
The difficulties in understanding husserl’s talk of the doubly 
empty horizon-intentions (i.e., empty both with regard to the 
intuitive and with regard to the symbolic) can be resolved if 
one recognizes that husserl’s conception of inner horizons as 
formed by empty intentions remains trapped in the vocabulary of 
“consciousness” and accordingly replaces this construction with 
the husserlian conception of acceptance-horizon [geltungshorizont] 
9  Passages from hua i quoted in the present essay generally follow the published english 
translation, which includes the hua i page numbers in the margin.
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introduced  above—and indeed, with a conception of an 
acceptance-horizon that is the correlate of knowledge and belief, 
hence the correlate of habitualities, and not of a particular sort 
of act or act-like act-moments called “empty intentions.” By 
habitualities husserl understands “abiding ego-properties” or 
“habitual determining properties” (hua i, §32, 101) that have 
been passively or actively acquired; to a certain extent, these have 
an intentional character, since they have intentional “contents” 
(such as convictions and willed decisions in particular), and 
to a certain extent they have a non-intentional character (e.g., 
a person’s typical way of walking or of behaving in conflicts). 
what is important in our context are habitualities that have an 
intentional character, and above all those one could call epistemic 
habitualities.10 
as husserl recognized by the beginning of the 1920s at the latest 
but probably already realized during the preceding decade,11 
only part of the sphere of intentionality consists of acts or 
intentional lived experiences; another part consists of intentional 
habitualities of various kinds whose intentionality differs from 
that of so-called acts. as will be shown below, acts too always 
10  The epistemic habitualities (including knowledge and belief) comprise only one part 
of the multifarious sphere of habitual intentionality; habitualities of willing and valuing in 
particular also belong to this sphere and co-contribute in their own way to the constitution of 
the concretely experienced lifeworld. in a text from 1926 on decision as a habituality of willing, 
husserl says (hua XXXiV, pp. 105f.): “a decision i make to go on a journey in eight days is not 
solely a momentary lived experience, [...] but my decision to go on this journey at that date. 
The decision to take a course of treatment every day for a year is a general decision, and in its 
generality it is ‘valid’ [“gültig”] for a year through all the individual activities i carry out, always 
recurring in being re-awakened as the same decision for me, the same person who is now acting 
in accordance with what I willed. For a year. Likewise, however, there are also infinite decisions 
in a true and literal sense. These include any decision for a vocation, a willed resolve that 
signifies an abiding general attitude of willing for the rest of one’s life [...]”
11  That husserl already had habitualities in view under the title of “psychic dispositions” in the 
years following 1910 can be seen from the following remark from ideas i (hua iii/1, §85, p. 195/206): 
“Belonging together with [the tendency toward a ‘psychology without a psyche’] is the fact that 
under the heading of the psychic—especially of the currently actual psychic in contrast to the 
corresponding ‘psychic dispositions’—one preferably thinks of lived experiences in the unity of the 
empirically posited stream of lived experiences.”  For the sake of consistency of terminology, passages 
from hua iii/1 quoted in the present essay will depart in some respects from the published english 
translation, whose page numbers will also be provided. That husserl paid attention to habitualities 
(and especially to intentional habitualities) could be due to the influence of Adolf Reinach; according 
to Wolfgang Künne (1986, p. 175), Reinach was “the first phenomenologist to draw a clear line between 
a lived experience such as judging and a state such as being convinced,” doing so in an essay that 
appeared in 1911 (Reinach 1911). Whether or not this historical claim is true may be able to be clarified 
on the basis of husserl’s nachlass. But it seems less probable when one considers that Brentano (1874) 
already speaks of “unconscious habitus and dispositions” or “habitual dispositions”, even though he 
excludes them from the sphere of the eo ipso conscious “psychic phenomena” (Book 1, ch. iii, §6; Book 
2, ch. ii, §2). This would have to have been husserl’s initial literary source for his distinction between 
intentional lived experiences and habitualities.
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have components of habitual intentionality, and would hardly 
be possible without them. if we limit talk of intentions to acts of 
consciousness, i.e., to intentional lived experiences, while taking 
appresenting empty horizons as horizons of acceptance, and indeed, 
as horizons of what is habitually known and believed, then there is no 
difficulty in understanding the emptiness or non-intuitiveness of 
what is horizonally co-accepted as the non-intuitiveness of what 
is merely co-known and co-believed. nor is it difficult to understand 
how what is known and believed contributes to the unitary 
objective sense of any perceived thing characterized by in-person 
givenness, standing there for consciousness as a physical thing 
as a whole and not merely one side of it. Thus when we look, for 
example, at the door of an individual closet familiar to us—e.g., 
our own clothes closet—we know how what is inside it looks, or if 
we see an individual yet typical clothes closet we are not familiar 
with, we apprehend it as “a” clothes closet and know in general 
what such a thing typically looks like inside.12 
Both types of knowledge—knowledge of an individual, which concerns 
a specific clothes closet familiar to us, and the general (and usually 
rather rough) typical knowledge of any clothes closet whatever—
have their sense-determining “efficacy” when we are perceiving 
clothes closets. But both types of knowledge play their role as 
knowledge, and knowledge is not an act: it is not an ephemeral 
episode within the stream of consciousness, but something 
habitual. Thus knowledge is something abiding in contrast to 
the flowing lived experiences, and as something belonging to 
the i, it is transcendent to the stream of consciousness, just as 
the stream’s i is transcendent to the stream and is the same i at 
various temporal locations within the stream.13 what is habitually 
12  what holds good here for the example of a perceived clothes closet also holds good for any 
perceived thing whatsoever: “each thing as a currently perceived thing in ontic acceptance 
[daseinsgeltung] is ‘apperceived typically’ in terms of its species and genus, and for their part 
the species and genus enter into the ont<ic> horizon as types that only now receive their 
‘determined’ particularization as what is proper to an ‘individual’” (hua XXXiX, pp. 140f.). when 
an unknown individual is apprehended according to its type, it receives a certain concomitant 
character of familiarity: “Even when the object is initially seized upon and is at first purely and 
simply contemplated, it does already have its horizons, which are co-awakened right away—first 
of all, an inner horizon [...]. The object stands there with a character of familiarity from the 
very beginning; it is apprehended as an object of a certain type that is already known in some 
way, even if in vague generality. Seeing the object awakens protentional expectations regarding 
its being-thus, its as yet unseen back side, etc.—regarding whatever individual properties that 
examining it in more detail would yield” (husserl 1976, §22, p. 114/104f.). 
13  John locke already had the distinction between episodic and non-episodic forms of 
knowledge in view with his distinction between actual knowledge and habitual knowledge—see an 
essay Concerning human understanding, Book 4, ch. i, §§8 and 9.
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known by a subject, which is sometimes termed “background 
knowledge,”14 is not a matter of conscious awareness, and is not a 
part of the actual or manifest content of consciousness in the 
pregnant sense. yet it determines this content in a peculiar fashion 
insofar as it essentially co-determines its core—the objective 
sense of the currently appearing object. The actual content of 
consciousness (e.g., “my clothes closet, appearing to me right 
now in such and such a way”) is indeed essentially co-determined 
by knowledge, but this co-determining knowledge is something 
habitual belonging to the I, and as such is not an actual, fleeting 
content of consciousness. Thus in the case of actual, episodic thing-
perception, the content of consciousness is empty with respect 
to the components of knowledge that are implicitly functioning 
constitutively without our being consciously aware of them either 
intuitively or symbolically. however, this emptiness is really no 
surprise; instead, it is a natural and a necessary consequence of 
the habitual and non-episodic nature of knowledge. as a content co-
determined by knowledge and therefore by something habitual, the 
intentional content of consciousness is accordingly characterized 
by an “emptiness” that Husserl conceived in terms of a specific sort 
of intentions proper to it—namely, empty intentions functioning in 
the inner horizon.  if in explaining the emptiness of inner horizons 
we resort not to empty intentions but instead to the habituality of 
knowledge and its contribution to the constitution of perceptual 
things, we can dispense with the descriptively inadequate 
construction of “empty intentions” in the sense of acts performed 
alongside other acts.   
what has been said here about husserl’s concept of empty 
intention also holds good for husserl’s terms “co-intending” 
[mitmeinung] and “meaning-more” [mehrmeinung]; when these 
terms refer to acts of co-intending and meaning-more, they 
14  Smith (2007) speaks of a “background of tacit understanding,” or for short, of the “relevant 
background” of a situation (p. 208). however, he neither brings out the habitual knowledge and belief 
that this background consists of, nor sees that what is most essentially constituted in these epistemic 
habitualities is what Husserl calls “horizon,” and more specifically “acceptance-horizon”; for Smith (p. 
287), what the “horizon of an act of consciousness” means is “the range of possibilities for the intended object 
that are left open by the act’s noematic sense together with relevant background ideas that are implicit 
or presupposed in the core sense.” Smith already defended this position in the important work he co-
authored with ronald mcintyre, (Smith and mcintyre 1982). in John r. Searle’s conception of intentionality, 
the background of habitual intentionality plays an important role under the title of a “network.” This 
is a holistic network of non-conscious “intentional states” such as convictions, wishes, hopes, etc., and 
according to Searle, it is these, along with a non-conscious background of abilities or “know-how” as well 
as general pre-intentional assumptions—all of which he terms “background” for short—that first make 
individual conscious states (and acts) possible as such. See Searle (1983), pp. 19–21, 65–71, and ch. V. 
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are just other expressions for the concept of empty horizon-
intention, and are used in the Cartesian meditations to characterize 
the constitutive function of horizon-intentionality. all 
they basically do is to broaden concepts like “meaning” and 
“intention”—concepts belonging to the vocabulary concerned 
with consciousness (a vocabulary that arose from the analysis 
of acts)—without truly grasping and adequately characterizing 
the phenomena of habitual intentionality that such terms 
address, phenomena that are indeed already in view in a certain 
way when such terms as co-intending and meaning-more are 
used. in the Cartesian meditations husserl is still talking about a 
particular type of meaning and intending when he speaks in §20 
of “meaning more” and “intending-beyond-itself” in articulating 
the “fundamental [insight]” that “as a consciousness, every cogito 
is indeed (in the broadest sense) a meaning of its meant [meinung 
seines gemeinten], but that, at any moment, this something meant 
[dieses Vermeinte] is more—something meant with something 
more—than what is meant at that moment ‘explicitly’” (Hua I, p. 
84). husserl explicitly characterizes this general state of affairs 
as a state of affairs in accordance with an eidetic law: “This 
intending-beyond-itself, which is implicit in any consciousness, must 
be considered an essential moment of it” (hua i, p. 84). 
The hidden “noetic multiplicities of consciousness and 
their synthetic unity, by virtue of which alone [...] we have 
one intentional object, and [in each case] this definite 
one, continuously meant—have it, so to speak, before us as 
[determined] thus and so” (hua i, p. 84), which husserl calls 
“hidden constitutive performances” here (hua i, p. 84) and 
are what he has in view under the title of “meaning more” 
[mehrmeinung], are not, however, phenomena of episodic act-
intentionality, as the reference to “noetic multiplicities of 
consciousness” suggests. instead, they are actually phenomena 
of non-episodic horizon-intentionality: they are neither acts 
nor act-like co-meanings or co-intendings, but intentional 
habitualities. These habitualities are beliefs [meinungen] that one 
has; as such, they function appresentationally in intentional acts 
of thing-perception and make an essential contribution to the 
perceptual constitution of things as wholes, since what is going 
on in thing-perception is a global positing of the thing as a whole 
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without secretly “co-intending” any qualities, pieces, or moments 
that are not directly visible. in any case, such “co-intending” 
in the sense of hidden acts or act-like intentions cannot be 
descriptively brought to light. it is otherwise with the habitual 
co-intendings that count as knowledge [Wissen]; in any given case 
they are in implicit co-acceptance [mitgeltung] within the global 
thing-acceptance [dinggeltung], and thus determine the objective 
sense of the currently intended thing. The sense-constitutive 
co-accepting of the knowledge both of general types and of 
individuals does indeed depend upon an actual performance of 
an act of thing-perception in order to enter into a constitutive 
function co-determining the sense at all. But this co-accepting is 
not itself an act-like co-intending implied in the act of perception: 
on closer inspection, the alleged horizonal co-intending of what 
does not “genuinely” appear is a horizonal having in co-acceptance 
[in-mitgeltung-haben], and as i have attempted to show, a having in 
co-acceptance in the mode of habitual knowledge, which is a form 
of non-episodic intentionality.
despite the fact that husserl’s talk of empty intentions, meaning 
more, and co-intentions remains trapped in the vocabulary 
of a static phenomenology of consciousness, he did have the 
habitual, constitutively functioning horizon-intentionality of 
acquired knowledge in view throughout, and thereby the sphere 
of non-episodic intentionality per se (to be sure, without making 
it fruitful for the “official” theory of horizon in the Cartesian 
meditations, for which horizons are “predelineated possibilities”15). 
This can be seen in numerous nachlass manuscripts from the 
15  See hua i, §19, p. 82: “The horizons are ‘predelineated’ possibilities. we say also: we can 
ask any horizon what ‘lies in it,’ we can explicate or unfold it, and ‘uncover’ the potentialities of 
conscious life at a particular time. Precisely thereby we uncover the objective sense meant implicitly 
in the actual cogito, though never with more than a certain degree of foreshadowing. [...] The 
predelineation [of the potentialities of conscious life] itself, to be sure, is at all times imperfect; 
yet, with its indeterminateness, it has a determinate structure.” It is this completely insufficient 
and even misleading characterization of the horizon that Smith and McIntyre appeal to when—
contrary to the position I defend, and contrary to numerous statements in Husserl—they do 
not take up the currently co-accepted “background beliefs” into the horizon itself, and merely 
allow the horizon to “predelineate”: “These beliefs play an essential role in the predelineation 
of an act’s horizon; they (or their Sinne) ‘motivate’ the possibilities making up the horizon by 
prescribing what would and would not count, for the subject, as further ‘determination’ of the 
object as it is given in the present act” (Smith and mcintyre 1982, pp. 249f.). That for husserl the 
horizon constitutive for the objective sense is not only a horizon of predelineated potentialities 
but essentially consists of the intentional contents of background beliefs is shown in, for 
instance, the following statement from experience and Judgment: “The object [...] is given for 
consciousness [ist bewusst] along with the horizon (albeit an empty horizon) of acquired knowledge” 
(husserl 1976, §25, p. 138/122f.).
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1920s and 1930s. But even in published works of this period such 
as Cartesian meditations and experience and Judgment, there are clear 
indications of the constitutive role of epistemic habitualities, 
and in particular of the constitutive role of the habituality of 
knowledge. in experience and Judgment he writes, for instance, 
as follows with regard to the knowledge of types that functions 
constitutively in the experience of things: 
a cognitive performance concerned with individual objects of 
experience is never carried out as if the latter were initially 
pregiven as substrates that were still entirely indeterminate. For us 
the world is always already a world in which cognition has already 
done its work in the most various ways: it is undoubtedly the case 
that there is no experience (in the sense of a first, unmodified 
thing-experience) that seizes upon this thing for the first time, 
taking cognizance of it, without already “knowing” more of it than 
what is thereby cognitively grasped. whatever any experience 
may experience in the genuine sense whereby something comes 
into view as “it, itself,” each experience necessarily has eo ipso 
a knowledge and co-knowledge with respect to this very thing—
namely, of something proper to it that has not yet come into view. 
This foreknowledge  is contentually indeterminate or incompletely 
determined, but never completely empty, and if it were not co-
accepted [wenn es nicht mitgelten würde], the experience would not 
be an experience of this one thing at all. (husserl 1976, §8, pp. 
26f./31f.; see also hua XXXiX, p. 126)
and with reference to the “habitual possession” (husserl 1976, §67, p. 
331/275; §68, p. 340/282; §79, p. 380/313) of object-determinations 
acquired through explication and constitutive for the objective 
sense, he writes:
[The object] has taken on forms of sense that were originally 
constituted in acts of explication, forms of sense [that are now 
taken on as] habitual knowledge. [...] The object [...] is [henceforth] 
given for consciousness along with the horizon (albeit an empty 
horizon) of acquired knowledge: the sediment of the active 
sense-bestowing in which [the object] previously received a 
determination is now a component part of the apprehension-sense 
of the perception [...]. (husserl 1976, §25, pp. 137f./122f.)
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in the Cartesian meditations, husserl relates the object-constitutive 
habitualities of the i both to constituted objects and to the 
constituted surrounding world:
This, my activity of positing and explicating being, sets up a 
habituality of my ego, by virtue of which the object, as having its 
manifold determinations, is mine abidingly. Such abiding acquisitions 
make up my surrounding world, so far as i am acquainted with it at 
the time, with its horizons of objects with which I am unacquainted—
that is: objects yet to be acquired but already anticipated with this 
formal object-structure. (hua i, §33, p. 102)16
although husserl did not take the intentional phenomenon of 
habitual knowledge (and its contribution to the constitution of 
things and of the world) sufficiently into account at the level of 
static phenomenology, and although this phenomenon is more 
concealed than revealed in his theory of empty intentions, at 
the level of genetic phenomenology he did clearly establish the 
constitutive contribution of the habitual and incorporate it 
into his theory of empty horizons.17 as i would like to show in 
what follows, what holds good for the habituality of knowledge 
in the constitution of objective sense similarly holds good 
for the habituality of belief: as a mode of habitually taking-
for-true, belief essentially contributes to the constitution 
of things and of the world, and must accordingly receive 
appropriate consideration in a transcendental-phenomenological 
description of intersubjective thing- and world-constitution. in 
phenomenology, as far as i know, hardly any attempts have been 
made so far to approach this issue.
Before i discuss the constitutive function of belief, i would like 
to offer some overdue explication of the concepts of “knowledge” 
and “belief”—concepts I have used up until now in their vague, 
everyday language signification, trusting that they would be 
generally understood.
16  one has the impression that in the Cartesian meditations, constitutive analyses from static 
phenomenology are presented immediately alongside constitutive analyses from genetic 
phenomenology.
17  Taking husserl’s later work as a point of departure, alfred Schutz investigated the role of 
knowledge (and especially our knowledge of types) in our lifeworldly experiencing, acting, and 
knowing; penetrating analyses are to be found in a work written between 1947 and 1951 (Schutz 1970).
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i am not using the expression “knowledge” in the sense of the 
standard analysis of propositional knowledge (“knowledge is 
justified true belief ”), a sense that edmund gettier has placed in 
question.18 The standard analysis can serve as an explication of 
one of the everyday language concepts of knowledge; however, 
i am using the expression “knowledge” in another sense of the 
word, likewise occurring in everyday language and arising from 
a contrast between knowledge and belief (in a non-religious sense 
to be discussed shortly). in what follows, “knowledge” will mean 
holding a statement for true, or a state of affairs for obtaining, 
on the basis of one’s own evidence, i.e., on the basis of one’s own 
experiences or one’s own insights, be these insights empirical or a 
priori. (This concept of knowledge corresponds, by the way, with 
the etymology of the german “wissen,” to know, as “having seen”; 
the same holds true for the greek “eidenai.”) in contrast, “belief” 
will mean holding a statement for true, or a state of affairs for 
obtaining, on the basis of trusting the knowledge of someone else one 
trusts.19 
i take my guiding concepts of belief and knowledge from Josef 
Pieper’s philosophical treatise On Belief.20 There Pieper, following 
Thomas of aquinas, explicates “belief ” as a three-placed 
predicate: “Believing always means: believing someone about 
something. The one who believes in the strict sense of the word 
accepts a state of affairs as actually obtaining on the basis of 
the testimony of someone else [...]” (Pieper 1962, p. 31).21 in this 
characterization of the concept Pieper emphasizes the following 
two interconnected elements: “on the one hand, agreeing with 
a [judgment about a] state of affairs, taking it for true; on the 
other hand, agreeing with a person, trusting [this person]” (p. 31), 
since “the basis [...] upon which one believes ‘something’ is that 
one believes ‘someone’” (p. 32). The following remarks by Pieper 
are also illuminating and fruitful for the problem of thing- and 
18  gettier (1963). See also, e.g., grundmann (2008), pp. 86–109.
19  a further concept of knowledge in everyday language encompasses both of the concepts 
of knowledge and belief just explicated: “knowing that p” means “being informed that p.” This 
more general (and more contentually impoverished) concept of knowledge leaves open what 
source the “information” comes from and cannot be used for my purposes, since what i am 
concerned with is precisely what the source of being informed is.
20  Pieper (1962) was reprinted in Pieper (1997). Page references in the present essay are to the 
german edition (Pieper 1962).
21  For the purposes of the present essay, the other current determination of belief as “taking 
[something] as true on a basis that is indeed objectively insufficient, but subjectively sufficient” (Kant 
1968, p. 67) is also unusable as an explication of the word “belief.”
EPISODIC AND NON-EPISODIC INTENTIONAlITy
rochUS Sowa rWTh aachen university 
256
world-constitution in the epistemic habitualities of knowledge 
and belief: “To believe means: to participate in the knowledge of 
someone who knows” (p. 49). Since such participation is a type of 
grasping reality, then someone who believes someone else who 
knows “is able to grasp more reality” (p. 52) than is possible when 
one relies only upon what one has experienced oneself or knows 
only on the basis of one’s own insights—and apart from cases of 
pathological mistrust, we do not normally rely solely upon our 
own experiences and insights in everyday life. instead, ever since 
early childhood we participate to an ever larger extent and in 
many different ways in a knowledge that we have not acquired for 
ourselves and that we ourselves do not genuinely possess.22
it is further essential for belief in the sense thematized here 
that the one who believes is subjectively certain of what he or she 
believes (cf. Pieper 1962, p. 60). This too is relevant for our problem 
of constitution, since whoever believes someone about something 
is relying upon the truth of what has been said, taking it “at face 
value.” For such a person, things are the way the believed, trusted 
other says they are. Thus for the one who believes, a state of affairs the 
other presents as obtaining does indeed obtain. in this respect belief 
has the same epistemic effect as knowledge: it makes reality 
accessible, and for the believing subject, it constitutes what exists 
in the pregnant sense, i.e., objects and states of affairs that are 
intersubjectively demonstrable as existing.23 it should therefore 
now be clear that belief in the sense of “taking objects as existing 
and states of affairs as obtaining” on the basis of the testimony of 
others has a crucial object- and world-constituting function, since 
apart from the relatively small compass of taking-for-true in the 
mode of knowledge (in the sense explicated above, i.e., taking-for-
true on the basis of one’s own experience and insight), it is above 
all taking-for-true in the mode of belief that has objects that 
22  here we may point to the epistemological problem of knowledge on the basis of the 
testimony of others, a problem that has been intensively discussed among analytically oriented 
epistemologists ever since coady (1992); cf. laskey and Sosa (2006).
23  In the case of knowledge and belief as specific forms of having-in-acceptance, it must be 
noted that with husserl, “holding good” or “acceptance” (geltung) is not the same as “validity” 
(gültigkeit). everything valid is indeed accepted as holding good, but not everything accepted 
as holding good has the status of validity. in this sense, as husserl says in an as yet unpublished 
manuscript, “To hold good is not yet to be valid in the pregnant sense. [...] Validity, truth [...] is 
a child of critique” (“geltend ist aber noch nicht im prägnanten Sinn gültig. [...] die gültigkeit, 
die Wahrheit [...] ist ein Kind der Kritik”—Ms. B I 10/56). in the present translation, “gültig” is 
translated as “valid”; the terms “gelten” and “geltung” are always rendered using some version of 
the locutions “holding good” and “acceptance.”
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exist and states of affairs that obtain as intentionally correlated 
with it, and that has a world holding good as existing as its total 
intentional correlate.
That belief has a thing- and world-constitutive function is 
familiar to everyone from everyday life. if we learn from people 
we believe that our neighbor is incurably ill with cancer, then 
on our next encounter we will see this neighbor with different 
eyes; the sense in which this person immediately appears to us 
in perception has become different. hence what we have here is 
belief, in the sense just explicated, in its constitutive function of 
determining the objective sense. it is similar in more primitive 
cases of “enrichment of meaning” and “continuing development of 
meaning” (hua Vi, p. 161/158). what husserl describes in the 
following quotation, although without using the word “belief ” 
(he speaks instead of “co-judging, as it were”), is a simple case 
of constitution through belief, a case in which the appresentation 
of a thing-quality is accomplished through taking over and 
believing something communicated and through the subsequent 
involuntary habitualization of what is thus taken over:
if someone says to me that the back side of the thing is red, then i 
apply the predicate “red” to it, co-judging, as it were; [...] then what 
the thing attains for me is both the closer determination of the 
back side as red and the conceptual content of this determination, 
although not on the basis of my own experience determining the 
thing. (hua XXXiX, p. 425)
The thing holds good for me henceforth—up until a possible 
correction of my conviction compels me to new knowledge—as a 
thing whose back side is red. my belief, my habitual taking what 
is said by another as true, thus determines the inner horizon of 
the thing, and thereby implicitly determines the total sense of the 
thing in the mode of a habitual intentionality.
Using the vocabulary of ideas i, husserl could characterize the 
habitual intentionalities of knowledge and belief as noeses, and 
indeed, as habitual noeses.24 as habitual noeses, the noeses of 
knowledge and belief are non-episodic noeses. But in contrast 
24  husserl introduced the concept of noesis as the concept correlative to that of noema 
in ideas i (1913), but it seems that all he thematized there were noeses that as performances 
of intentional sense-bestowing had the character of currently lived (or livable) intendings, 
intendings we are explicitly conscious of (hua iii/1, cf. §§85, pp. 87f.).
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to episodic noeses (e.g., judgments performed in speech acts 
of assertion or perceptual observations of processes), i have no 
consciousness of the habitual noeses of knowledge and belief. it 
is even a criterion of habitual noeses that we can legitimately 
ascribe them to someone asleep or unconscious, whereas we 
cannot ascribe episodic noeses to a sleeping or unconscious 
person. Thus, for example, i can legitimately claim that a sleeping 
person knows that Paris is the capital of France or that 2 × 2 = 
4, just as i can legitimately claim that this person knows how 
to swim or to play the piano. when someone knows or believes 
this or that, this person is not prereflectively aware of this 
knowledge or belief (along with the known or believed-in state 
of affairs); the person has no lived experience of this knowledge 
or belief: to use the language of Brentano, it is not the content of 
an accompanying “inner consciousness.”25 what characterizes 
acts (intentional lived experiences)—namely, that they are lived, 
that we are preref lectively aware of them as such—does not apply 
to the habitualities of knowledge and belief. when i know that 
Paris is the capital of France or that 2 × 2 = 4, i do not have a lived 
experience of knowing these states of affairs. in contrast, when i 
am watching a bird sitting in a tree, i am immediately conscious 
of perceiving something; when i add 143 and 922 “in my head,” i 
am immediately aware that i am doing so. when i carry out such 
episodic noeses, someone can ask me, “what are you doing right 
now?” or “what were you doing a moment ago?” (using the word 
“doing” in the broadest sense), and i can provide the answer on 
the basis of my prereflective awareness of the acts carried out, 
saying, for instance, “right now i am watching the bird in that 
tree over there” or “i just added 143 and 922 ‘in my head.’” it is 
similar for the episodic psychic states that i am aware of (feelings, 
moods), states about which someone can ask me, “how are you 
feeling right now?” But this kind of question cannot be posed in 
principle about habitual noeses.
25  cf. Brentano’s exposition in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Brentano 1874), Book 
2, ch. ii, iii. given the sharp distinction Brentano draws between inner perception and inner 
observation (Book 1, §2), the only thing Brentano can mean by “inner perception” or “inner 
consciousness” is what has more recently been termed prereflective self-awareness. Gallagher 
and Zahavi allege that when Brentano speaks of inner consciousness, he means something 
other than “prereflectively, my experience is not itself an object for me” or “I do not occupy 
the position of an observer, spectator, or in(tro)spector who attends to this experience”—see 
gallagher and Zahavi (2008), p. 53; however, this interpretation has no foundation in the text of 
the abovementioned two chapters on inner consciousness in Brentano’s main work. 
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That it belongs to the essence of habitual noeses of knowledge and 
belief that they are not present for lived experience or preref lective 
awareness does not alter their status as intentional, for they are 
both characterized by the same feature that acts or intentional 
lived experiences also exhibit: namely, by mineness [ Jemeinigkeit] 
and by having an intentional objectivity (an object in the narrower 
sense or a state of affairs), a theme, something that they are 
“about” (in discussions of intentionality in english-speaking 
philosophy of mind, this latter specific quality of intentionality 
has tentatively been termed “aboutness”). The habitualities of 
knowledge and belief are distinguished by mineness insofar as 
they have an intentional subject, i.e., the subject who knows or 
believes something. 
They are distinguished by so-called “aboutness” or 
“directedness”26 toward an intentional objectivity insofar as they 
are related to an objectivity (an object in the narrower sense or 
a state of affairs)—one that as an intentional objectivity has the 
distinguishing feature that nothing real has to correspond to it: 
the object purely and simply as intended need not exist, the state 
of affairs purely and simply as intended need not obtain.27 we can 
nevertheless thematize the intended objectivity as such (i.e., 
the currently intended objectivity as intended), analyzing and 
describing the manner in which it is intended without paying 
the slightest attention to the question of the reality of what has 
been purely and simply intended. if we use the term “noema” 
to designate not only what is intended as such in the case of 
episodic noeses but also what is intentionally meant as such in a 
non-episodic manner in knowledge and belief (i.e., the habitually 
26  The metaphorical talk of “being directed” toward something (an objectivity in the broadest 
sense) is only good for a first, rough characterization of intentionality, and proves inadequate 
for numerous types of episodic intentionality. however, we cannot use the metaphor for the 
epistemic habitualities of knowledge and belief either, as if a subject were “directed” toward 
known or believed-in objectivities (states of affairs); here the metaphor of “aboutness” is more 
appropriate. in these and in all other cases of intentional relatedness toward something, both 
locutions (“directedness” and “aboutness”) point to the formal quality whereby intentional 
relations are asymmetrical relations: something (and indeed, always a “subject”) is related to 
something (an “object”) in a certain way, not the other way around.
27  as husserl says in §90 of ideas i, “every intentional lived experience [...] has its ‘intentional object,’ 
i.e., its objective sense. [...] The situation defining [this] sense for us [is] the circumstance [...] that the 
non-existence (or the conviction of non-existence) of the objectivated or thought of object pure and 
simple pertaining to the objectivation in question (and therefore to any particular intentional lived 
experience whatever) cannot rob any objectivation of its ‘being objectivated’ as such” (hua iii/1, pp. 
206f./217f.).
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accepted as such), then with knowledge and belief we have noeses 
that do indeed have an intended objectivity (a habitually intended 
state of affairs as such), but as habitual noeses do not have the 
character of being carried out in prereflective awareness.
in light of such non-conscious noeses, husserl’s concept of noesis 
becomes problematic; the question arises whether we need the concept 
of noesis at all—indeed, whether it has any descriptive contents at all. 
either the habitualities of knowledge and belief are noeses, or they 
are not. In the first case, if they are noeses, then it is not essential for 
noeses to be lived experiences of which we are prereflectively aware, 
so “noesis” becomes equivalent to “having a noema”—e.g., the noesis of 
being convinced is nothing other than having a conviction, and visual 
perceiving is nothing but having a visual perceptual appearance. But 
in the second case, if they are not noeses, then there is no universal 
“correlation” of noesis and noema characterizing the entire field of 
intentionality in general, and the correlation must accordingly be 
limited to the sphere of intentional lived experiences. with the former 
case, we are close to dispensing with the concept of noesis entirely and 
characterizing the multiform field of intentionality purely noematically, 
i.e., limiting all descriptive analyses of acts and habitualities to 
analyses of noemata.28 in the latter case, we have the by no means 
trivial task of descriptively exhibiting the actuality of noeses in the 
sphere of intentional lived experiences and giving the concept of 
noesis a precise signification. If one wants to retain both the concept 
of noesis and the so-called noetic-noematic correlation as a universal 
correlation—which is what I would like to advocate—then one must 
allow non-conscious habitual noeses on the one hand while showing 
on the other hand how episodic and non-episodic (habitual) noeses can 
be descriptively brought to light. This would call for attaining greater 
determinateness and a definitive content not only for the concept 
of the noesis, but also for the notoriously controversial notion of the 
noema.
i am conscious of a judgment or a perception i actually carry out, 
and such consciousness is “inner perception” in Brentano’s sense, 
i.e., I am prereflectively aware of performing such an act, and in 
28  hans-Ulrich hoche has been advocating dispensing with the noema ever since publishing 
his handlung, Bewusstsein und leib (hoche 1973). he is particularly convincing in his latest book 
(hoche 2007), especially in his extensive essay on “consciousness” (pp. 129–95), which from a 
methodological point of view provides a successful synthesis of the methods of phenomenology 
and of linguistic analysis. 
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each case i can in principle provide descriptions of it through 
subsequent reflection founded on retention or recollection. As 
shown above, however, it is completely different in the case of 
the habitual noeses of knowledge and belief. among these (and 
certainly not the least of these) we find knowledge of our own 
current “circumstances” (in the broadest sense), especially the 
knowledge of where i am in space and time right now. at the 
moment, for instance, i know that while i am composing this 
text I am in my office at the philosophical institute in Aachen. 
But i am not explicitly conscious of this knowledge, in contrast, 
for example, to the numerous acts of thinking and writing i am 
performing while I’m working on this section of the essay—I am 
prereflectively aware of the latter acts as I carry them out, and thus 
I can recall them and thematize them in acts of reflection. To this 
(non-conscious) knowledge of one’s own current circumstances 
there also belongs the knowledge of social circumstances and 
relationships. Thus i know, e.g., that i am at a party when i am 
discussing a philosophical problem with another guest at the party, 
or that i am talking to my superior when i am making a request 
to the head of the institute, and this sort of knowledge of my 
circumstances is also characterized by non-episodic intentionality.  
i am indeed not conscious of my habitual noeses (along with their 
noemata), but they are nevertheless undoubtedly “there” and 
determine the sense of the currently appearing objectivity (more 
generally: the objectivity i am currently conscious of). But there 
is more to it than that. These non-conscious noeses also effectively 
determine my action: they are at work (and their efficacy can be 
descriptively brought to light) in all cases of action in which 
the actor automatically takes habitually accepted contents (of 
knowledge or belief) into account. and apart from the “actions” 
of newborns, this is true for all actions. even when the actor is 
giving no thought whatever to these contents (and thus is not 
“conscious” of them in the narrower sense of being explicitly aware 
of them), they are mentally, as it were, “in view” [“in Sicht”] insofar 
as the actor is taking them into consideration in “circumspective” 
[“umsichtig”] action.29 Thus, for example, we are habitually keeping 
29  what heidegger describes in §§22 and 23 of Sein und Zeit (heidegger 1927) as the familiar 
spatial surrounding world “circumspectively” [umsichtig] articulated into “places” and “regions” 
is a phenomenon that cannot be made comprehensible without turning to the habitual 
intentionality of knowledge and belief. in a genetic perspective, all forms of familiarity and 
acquaintance turn out to be manifestations of habitual intentionality.
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in mind that we are at a museum when we speak in muted tones 
and refrain from munching on the sandwiches we’ve brought along 
or lighting up a cigarette. we know, or as we can also loosely say, 
we are “aware” that we are in a museum, and we act accordingly 
without bringing the fact that we are in the museum to explicit 
awareness (whether continually or discretely).
what holds good both for praxis in the usual sense and for the 
situated knowledge relevant to the action concerned also holds 
good for perception, which husserl called a “primal praxis” 
[urpraxis] underlying all other practice.30 when we are perceiving 
a house, for example, whatever we know about an individual 
house familiar to us or about houses in general is also habitually 
mentally “in view,” and this knowledge has its effect in the 
primal praxis of perception, co-determining the individually and 
typically determined sense that the perceived objectivity has for 
us as well as co-determining the way we behave toward it. This 
is what lends an individually or merely typically familiar thing 
(we know this specific house or this type of house31) its character 
of “familiarity” [“Bekanntheitscharakter”]. But what is known 
(gewusst) about a house in this manner (and thereby functions in 
determining the sense of what we are perceiving) has nothing to 
do with anything explicitly conscious (bewusst). it is not a manifest 
content of consciousness—all we are explicitly conscious of here 
is the perceptually intended house as a whole, even though it 
does have a certain implicit character of individual or typical 
familiarity. and the moment that determines the perceived house 
as “familiar” is the moment in which the habitual noesis of the 
relevant knowledge “exerts its efficacy.”
insofar as knowledge and belief are horizon-intentionalities that 
essentially co-participate in the constitution of any (individually 
or typically) familiar perceptual thing we encounter, they are a 
phenomenon of habitual intentionality for which we could coin 
the german term “gewusstsein” (literally, being-known), following 
the model of the german word “Bewusstsein” (consciousness—
30  See hua XXXiX, Beilage XXVi, pp. 382–84.
31  here and elsewhere in the present essay i am disregarding the everyday language 
distinction between two german verbs meaning “to know,” “kennen” and “wissen.” we say that 
we know objects (especially persons and places) in the sense that we “recognize” them (kennen), 
but not that we know them in the sense of possessing knowledge about them (wissen). however, i 
am taking the concept of knowledge (Wissen) in a broad sense that also includes recognizing and 
being familiar with objects. (note that the english version of this essay also makes no distinction 
between being explicitly “conscious” of something and being explicitly “aware” of it.) 
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literally, being-conscious). how could this be expressed in 
english? we might turn to the neologism “knownness,” but not 
as a predicate that merely expresses the status of something 
known irrespective of the way in which it is known. instead, what 
“knownness” points to here is first of all a specific manner of 
being-known that is not a matter of our being explicitly conscious 
of something. in addition, however, our concept of “knownness” 
refers to something that is not only already known, but comes 
into play by implicitly “informing” our lived experience in a 
currently given case, exerting its efficacy by contributing to 
the constitution of the sense of the situation or object itself. 
Thus in the present essay, the term “knownness”—a term that 
can play a useful role in the theory of constitution and that 
will be understood in a broad sense including implicitly being-
believed-in—designates the habituality of taking states of affairs 
as obtaining, and doing so in the modes of knowledge and belief 
in such a way that what is known or believed in is relevant to the 
situation of the action and/or sense-determining, here and now, for 
what one is currently explicitly and thematically aware of through an 
intentional lived experience. 
hence it is this actual, living, sense- and action-determining 
reference to what we are currently thematically conscious of 
in any given case that distinguishes the contents of “knownness” 
from sheer contents of knowledge. Knowledge can also be 
“dead,” completely irrelevant for the current situation and 
the objectivities given for consciousness (and most of our 
individual stock of knowledge is irrelevant for the currently 
actual situation!); in contrast, the contents of knownness are, 
in accordance with our concept of knownness, distinguished 
by being situationally relevant and by their immediate sense-
reference to what is currently thematic for consciousness. But if, 
along with husserl, we understand the expression “consciousness” 
in the narrowest sense, contents of knownness are not contents 
of consciousness, even if they contribute to (and in this sense 
co-comprise) the sense of the objectivity or action that we are 
explicitly aware of. when i am admiring the closet door i am 
looking at, I already “know” that it leads to something “inside”—I 
don’t have any sense that what I am looking at is a dummy door—
yet i am not “conscious of ” this interior: it is not the object of 
an intentional lived experience (and although i “know” that i 
EPISODIC AND NON-EPISODIC INTENTIONAlITy
rochUS Sowa rWTh aachen university 
264
could explore what is inside the closet in new acts, i only “know” 
this because, and to the extent to which, i “know” that it has an 
“inside” in the first place). in the narrowest sense of the words 
“conscious” and “consciousness,” contents of knownness are “non-
conscious.” Thus with regard to these contents we find ourselves 
in the epistemic state that husserl terms “non-consciousness,” 
since “what is ‘conscious’ in the narrowest sense means [...] what 
i am occupied with, what pertains to the unity of the being-
occupied-with—and this itself once again has a central mode, 
<that> of having consciousness of, being conscious of, in the 
narrowest sense of all, [referring to] what lies in the center, the 
original point of [our] being-occupied-with-[something]” (hua 
Xlii, p. 38). Thus contents of knownness are non-conscious in 
both the narrow and the narrowest sense of the word “conscious.” 
however, they are also non-conscious in the broader sense of 
“conscious” in which this term is applied to the perceptual field 
that i always have as an awake i, a field that includes everything 
that is merely affectively present and “ready” to be perceived.32 
compared with these three significations of “conscious,” then, 
habitual contents of knownness are non-conscious, whether 
they arise from one’s own experiences and insights or rest 
on the testimony of others. as indicated above, however, in a 
certain manner they are nevertheless “there” as contents co-
accepted in the contents of consciousness pertaining to the 
current thing-perception—they “too” are “there” [“mit da”] as 
contents co-determining the currently actual objective sense. The 
intentional consciousness currently intending its thematic object 
is “saturated” and “permeated,” as it were, with knownness, and 
would hardly be thinkable in its current concrete intentionality 
without this knownness. Suppose, for instance, that we attempted 
to remove all contents of knownness—everything having to do 
with what is individually or typically known or believed—from 
the perceptual consciousness we have when looking at our 
wristwatch, stripping away the individual and typical character of 
familiarity pertaining to “my watch,” “any watch whatever,” “any 
cultural thing whatever,” “any thing whatever”; such a denuded 
perception would not even deserve the name “thing-perception.” 
husserl therefore says the following about the contentually 
more or less determinate (but never empty) constitutively co-
32  cf. hua Xlii, p. 55.
EPISODIC AND NON-EPISODIC INTENTIONAlITy
rochUS Sowa rWTh aachen university 
265
functioning individual and typical “knowledge and co-knowledge” 
of a thing: “if it were not co-accepted, then the experience would 
not be an experience of this one thing at all” (husserl 1976, §8, p. 
27/32; emphasis added).
Such thought experiments attempting to omit something known 
or believed can help to determine whether or not something is 
currently co-accepted—whether something belongs to a specific 
actual content of consciousness as a relevant “knownness,” or 
whether it is situationally irrelevant knowledge that remains 
“dead” at the moment. lived experiences of disappointment have 
a similar function. if, for example, i am putting on the shirt i had 
laid out to wear on my trip and discover, to my annoyance, that 
there is a button missing, this demonstrates after the fact that 
when i was getting my travel clothes ready, i had “presumed” 
that all of the buttons were there—thus that a state of affairs 
did indeed “obtain”—without ever having explicitly intended 
this state of affairs or having become thematically aware of it. 
however, the habitual presumption that has been situationally 
“activated” as relevant here in the form of “taking this state of 
affairs as obtaining” is nothing other than “knownness” in the 
sense discussed, and the state of affairs held to obtain is nothing 
other than its knownness-content. 
Up to this point, i have attempted to show that the perceptual 
consciousness of things mingles episodic and non-episodic 
intentionality, and that such habitualities as knowledge and belief 
play an important—and indeed necessary—constitutive role in such 
consciousness. in what follows, i would like to provide a sketch of 
the role these epistemic habitualities play in the constitution of the 
world of realities as a whole, suggesting how they are co-effective in 
“bringing the world’s being and being-thus to constant acceptance 
for me” (“für mich Sein und Sosein der welt zu beständiger geltung 
zu bringen”—Ms. B I 14/37b). This broader problem of constitution 
can be put into words in the following question: what makes it 
possible for us to be “conscious” of a world as a whole in every moment 
of our waking life while we are intentionally occupied with this and 
that, so that we are therefore “conscious” of our waking life as a 
living-in-the-world? here too, husserl’s answer makes good use of 
the concept of horizon in the form of the outer horizon and of the 
world-horizon as the outermost outer horizon.
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a text from 1933 offers the following illuminating 
characterizations of the concept of horizon in general and of the 
concepts of both inner horizon and outer horizon, with the latter 
lying halfway, as it were, to the concept of world-horizon:
The horizonality—the non-conscious milieu surrounding what we 
are currently specifically aware of, or the horizon of latent, non-
conscious, and yet co-accepted sense pertaining to the patent, 
intuitively fulfilled sense, and indeed, as co-determining <the> 
sense of the patent objectivity—is, however, a double horizonality. 
on the one hand, it concerns the substrate-structure of the 
intuitively presented real item insofar as the latter [...] has its 
[inner] horizon of explication; [...] <on the other hand>, the concrete 
objects stand within outer horizons, within their intuitive fields, 
which in their ontic sense themselves have [...] sense-determinations 
“from the outside.” (hua XXXiX, pp. 102–104)
what husserl here calls “horizon” is the sense-determining, co-
accepted “non-conscious milieu surrounding what we are currently 
specifically aware of,” and this corresponds to what has previously 
been said about the habitual horizon-intentionalities of knowledge 
and belief, whose knowledge- and belief-contents are non-conscious, 
but—as co-accepted contents—are nevertheless sense-determining 
for the conscious or patent objective sense. in the passage just quoted, 
Husserl characterizes the outer horizon as the field of intuitive 
but unthematic objects surrounding the object that is currently 
thematically intuitive. whenever we are related to an object of this 
field through an act of perception, we are automatically and “passively” 
(non-actionally) co-related to this co-appearing field. Beyond this 
passively co-appearing perceptual field given in horizonal awareness 
we find an enveloping field of which we are not conscious, yet toward 
which we are always “intending beyond” (as husserl terms it in his 
vocabulary of consciousness). But such intending-beyond toward 
what is no longer perceived is a habitual intending-beyond in the 
form of knowledge and belief. and as a habitual, universal horizon-
intention, it ultimately reaches beyond all currently intuitive fields to 
the world constantly co-accepted as the total unity of realities. as the 
quotation above puts it, each intuitive individual thing receives “sense-
determinations ‘from the outside,’” i.e., from the habitually known and 
believed-in world. in addition, however, the currently co-conscious, 
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indeterminately delimited perceptual field as a whole receives the 
sense of being something from the world or a sector of the world. Speaking 
of being “conscious” or “aware” of something in a loose sense of these 
expressions, Husserl writes as follows about this sense—a sense that all 
appearing things (as well as qualities of and relations between things) 
have, as appearing, in common: “[we are] conscious of all of [...] the real 
items we are currently aware of as real objects (qualities, relations, etc.) 
from the world, as existing within the one spatiotemporal horizon” 
(husserl 1976, §8, p. 29/33). husserl characterizes this peculiar sense-
determination quite similarly in another text in which (once again using 
his extended vocabulary of consciousness) he says of the “total world-
field” (“totale[n] Weltfeld”) that it “is in acceptance for consciousness by 
virtue of an indeterminately general co-intending that constantly gives 
the sector as such the sense of [being a] sector” (“bewusstseinsmäßig 
in geltung ist, vermöge einer unbestimmt allgemeinen mitmeinung, 
die ständig dem ausschnitt als solchem den Sinn eines ausschnittes 
gibt”—Ms. E III 11/2a). This sense of being a sector, of “being something 
from the world”—this sense with which everything real appears to us, 
a sense that lends anything and everything, even the most fleeting 
and private stirrings of our souls, the sense of worldliness—is, however, 
not a phenomenon of consciousness. instead, as an effect of horizon-
intentionality, and as a phenomenon of habitual knowledge and belief, 
it is a phenomenon of knownness in the sense explicated above. at every 
moment of our waking lives we know of the world as the totality of 
spatiotemporal realities constantly encompassing us, and we know this 
in the form of a habitual “indeterminately general co-intending.” But 
this means that in all experience of real items, we also have an implicit 
knowledge of each appearing real item, each appearing plurality of real 
items, and each field of real items within which something real appears 
as salient as being sectors of the world.33 when husserl says that the 
“world [...] [is] pregiven as holding good horizonally” (“welt [...] vorgegeben 
[ist] als horizonthaft geltende”—ms. a Vii 12/81a, emphasis added), he is 
using neutral terminology to characterize this universal descriptive 
state of affairs. The use of the locution “holding good horizonally” 
offers the possibility of doing descriptive justice both to the sectoriality 
33  This implicit knowledge of “the world” can take very different forms and varies not only from 
culture to culture, but within a person’s lifespan, as well as within the history of smaller and larger 
human communities. The world comes to awareness [bewusst] or is known [gewusst] differently for 
humans with a mythical image of the world and humans whose worldview is shaped by modern 
science. The different knowledge of (and belief about) the world co-determines in each case what 
the world currently holds good as and how it is co-accepted in experience and action.
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already mentioned and to the fact that “any experience of something 
belonging to the world [is] at the same time [implicitly] an experience 
(although an unthematic one) of the world as a totality” (“jede 
erfahrung von weltlichem, obschon unthematisch, [implizit] zugleich 
totale Welterfahrung [ist]”—Ms. A VII 12/79b), thus avoiding the vague 
and awkward talk of “co-intending” or “co-consciousness,” as well as 
the ambiguous sense in which the noun “co-intending” (mitmeinung) can 
refer either to the noetic side (mitmeinen as the act of co-intending) or to 
the noematic side (mitgemeinte as its co-intended correlate). 
Because the “noetic” or subjective “correlate” of ongoing and enduring 
ontic acceptance [Seinsgeltung] is not a current episodic intending or 
having-in-consciousness but a habitual having-in-acceptance, and 
because knowledge and belief are both fundamental epistemic modes of 
having-in-acceptance, the subjective “correlate” of the sense-formation 
holding good for me as “existing world” is a knowing or believing. 
as habitual horizon-intentionalities, knowledge and belief are the 
“passive” (non-actional), non-episodic subjective performances thanks 
to which we have a world at all, and indeed, have it as the “existing 
total unity of realities existing in themselves” (hua XXXiX, p. 83) 
that is necessarily co-accepted with ontic certainty in the experience 
of real items.34 But as the habitually known or believed-in universal 
unity of sense and acceptance, the world of realities—a world that 
we are not explicitly aware of in experiencing individual mundane 
realities—is still not something that we are somehow “co-aware” of, 
not something “co-intended” in act-like fashion as is the case with, 
say, the co-perceived background co-appearing with a seen thing. The 
language of “knowledge” and “belief” is suitable for the phenomenon of 
habitually having-in-acceptance, and allows us to call the phenomenon 
we are actually dealing with (i.e., the epistemic phenomenon of habitual 
intentionality) by its true name without tempting us to overextend the 
vocabulary of “intending” or to reach for such ambiguous expressions 
as “co-intending” or “meaning more.” with the help of the terms 
“knowledge” and “belief,” then, we can give unequivocal expression to 
the intentional performances that make the world present to us at every 
moment of our waking life as the totality of realities that are habitually 
held in constant ontic acceptance—and that constantly make us, 
ourselves habitually present to ourselves as beings existing in the world 
34  The being of the world is certain because “as the totality of individual entities standing 
in co-acceptance starting from any [particular] individual entity, the total horizon cannot 
be modalized. The type of ontic certainty [Seinsgewissheit] of the world that is founded in 
the modalizable certainty pertaining to individual [entities] is the apodictic basis for all 
modalizations, etc.” (hua XXXiX, p. 128). 
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at every moment of our waking life.35 These intentional performances 
consist precisely in the “appresenting” performances of knowledge and belief, 
which as habitualities are necessarily non-conscious, but which as sense-
determining intentional performances lend all spatiotemporal realities—
and thereby us, ourselves—the sense of being mundane, of being something 
in the world. in a manuscript from the 1930s, husserl expresses this state 
of affairs as follows: 
whatever i may be thematically occupied with, it is known to me 
as something existing in the world. with anything and everything, 
i have ontic certainty of the world. i have this a priori with every 
single experience, with every single perceptual field, with every 
single theme, with everything, as a horizon of continual, permanent 
certainty running through shifting themes. (hua XXXiX, p. 73)36
The permanence of a world holding good as existing for an i is the 
“correlate” of the permanence of the habitualities that this i has 
developed or acquired, since the i at the center of the countless 
performances of intentional life is a concrete subject for whom the 
world “constantly” exists—and is such a subject only as a “substrate of 
habitualities” rather than as “an empty pole of identity” (hua i, §32, pp. 
35  here it can merely be mentioned that by being known in empty horizons as the universe of 
what is present and co-present, the world is also known as a world with a world-past and a world-
future. husserl emphasizes the role of empty intentions in the constitution of the world as a temporal 
formation in a manuscript from 1932: “as soon as we are directed toward things we speak of what 
exists in their surroundings but is not seen. Thus in its infinity, in its indeterminate determinability, 
the surrounding world is given at any moment as the surrounding world relative to our own lived 
body, and is given originaliter. as [it is] for the present, so [is it] also similar for <the> future through 
the accompanying expectations and for <the> past through the empty retentions. what is constituted 
through all of these forms of empty intentions is thus not only the delimited unitary thing or a 
‘genuinely’ perceived part of the surrounding world, but the entire world in an indeterminate spatial 
present stretching into the past and into an indeterminate future” (hua XXXiX, p. 143).
36  It may be remarked in passing that this state of affairs—i.e., the fact that the world I experience 
at every waking moment as “a world holding good for me as existing” is a formation of habitual 
knowledge, belief, and knownness—determines the methodical sense of the phenomenological epochē: 
i cannot refrain from knowledge of the world and of entities in the world, i cannot abandon this 
conviction, because all i can refrain from is the performance of acts; however, convictions such as 
knowledge and belief are not acts, but something habitual. as husserl says in numerous places, all i 
can refrain from is making use of my world-knowledge and world-belief, for “having a conviction and 
making use of this conviction within a sphere of judgment, letting an ontic ground be given through 
the conviction, are two different things” (hua mat iV, p. 74).  it lies within our freedom to make no 
use of our convictions; we can decide to make no use of them, and as phenomenologists, we can 
maintain this decision in our descriptive work, thus refraining from all prescientific and scientific 
judgments that explicitly or implicitly posit the existence of the world or of items in the world. 
Through this refraining (epochē) we reduce the sphere of possible judgments to the sphere of possible 
phenomenological judgments, i.e., to the sphere of possible judgments about pure phenomena—
phenomena purified of naive positing of entities: “phenomena of being” [“Seinsphänomene”], phenomena 
in which entities still appear, but only as entities holding good for me (us) as existing. 
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100f.). what holds good for individual objects constituted as existing 
also holds good for the world constituted as existing as a whole: 
the “abiding existence and being-thus [is] a correlate of the 
habitualit[ies]  constituted in the ego-pole [itself] by virtue of 
[its] position-taking[s]” (hua i, §33, p. 102). it is by virtue of such 
position-takings and of countless acquired and “firmly developed” 
habitualities that “a nature [...], a cultural world, a [human] world 
with [its] social forms, and so forth” exists for an i (hua i, §37, pp. 
109f.). husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological principle “that 
nothing exists for me otherwise than by virtue of the actual and 
potential performance of my own consciousness”37 is accordingly to be 
supplemented by adding, “or by virtue of the intentional performance 
of non-conscious habitualities,” since habitualities essentially belong 
to the performances of the “effective intentionality” thanks to which 
entities—and finally, the world as a whole—exist for me at all. 
as the constitution of an objective world existing through and for 
a concrete subject endowed with habitualities, world-constitution 
necessarily has an intersubjective dimension: the objective world, 
which has the sense, “world for everyone,” rests upon communication 
and tradition, and thereby upon taking over and “believing” the 
knowledge of others. nature in particular (in the sense of what holds 
good for us as objective nature) is an intersubjective unity of sense and 
acceptance whose subjective correlate is empirical knowledge that 
is intersubjectively confirmed and accepted as valid [gültig], i.e., 
knowledge procured by natural science—more concretely, knowledge 
that natural scientists convey to us and that we “believe” and take 
over for our own stock of knowledge.38 The world holding good for 
37  hua XVii, §94, p. 241/234. husserl expresses the same principle in two further places in 
the same section: “no being nor being-thus for me, whether as actuality or as possibility, but as 
accepted by me [mir geltend]” (hua XVii, p. 241/234); “whatever i encounter as an existing object is 
something that [...] has received its whole being-sense for me from my effective intentionality; not 
a shadow of that sense remains excluded from my effective intentionality” (hua XVii, p. 241/234).
38  as early as 1917 husserl already mentions the role that “believing in” knowledge taken over 
from others plays in the intersubjective constitution of the world; writing in “Phänomenologie und 
erkenntnistheorie” (a paper never published during his lifetime), he says: “[...] to a great extent (although 
not always), i do not content myself with merely empathizing with [other persons]; rather, i ‘take 
over’ their experiences, their judgments, their theories—i.e., I do not merely ascribe these to others as 
opinions and convictions these others hold, but simultaneously award them the value of being accepted 
by me. Along with my experience via empathy—my experience that the other is experiencing thus and 
such—I carry out a ‘co-experience,’ participating in their positing even where I am not simultaneously 
experiencing the same objectivities that i have ascribed to them as actual experiential givens. it is the 
same when i believe in and take up any descriptive statements that others make about something i myself 
have not seen. Thus to a great extent it is through this kind of co-positing that i adopt and am informed by 
many of the position-takings i have experienced via empathy, especially with regard to others’ judgments 
and conclusions about the world, with regard to their world-knowledge of any type” (hua XXV, p. 180).
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each individual is accordingly not merely a sense-formation whose 
subjective correlate is each individual’s own knowledge, but is also, 
and above all, a sense-formation that is the correlate of belief in 
the sense of accepting the truth of something communicated by 
others. The world intersubjectively valid [gültig] as existing (be it 
a prescientific lifeworld or a world objectively determined by the 
natural and cultural sciences) rests above all upon the knowledge of 
others, a knowledge we take over from others whose truth we trust—
especially, in our modern world based on epistemic division of labor, 
from those who are experts in their field and as such have reliable 
knowledge about this or that aspect of the world. as laypersons 
(which we all are with regard to nearly all scientific disciplines, and 
most of us are with respect to all of them), we trust these experts 
and their corroborated procedures for attaining secure, dependable, 
intersubjectively definitive knowledge. in this way our knowledge of 
the world is broadened through belief. Thus when on the basis of such 
belief we habitually take a state of affairs as obtaining, this is an 
essential, or even the most essential, noetic-noematic component 
in the constitution of the objective world holding good for us as 
objective. For in such believing—which is not unlike the blind faith 
of the celebrated/notorious charcoal burner39—we do indeed believe 
in science (unless we are extremely skeptical of it), and we let science 
tell us what the world is and what “holds it together at the heart [im 
innersten zusammenhält].”40  
39  Josef Pieper writes as follows concerning certain insulting language that luther let loose upon 
the world (and concerning the thereby unjustly disparaged matter in question): “The ‘implicit faith’ 
[das ‘unausdrücklich einbeschließende glauben’] (termed fides implicita by the Scholastics) is something 
recognized and practiced everywhere else. To be sure, in theology the concept of fides implicita has 
become controversial”; referring to martin luther’s 1533 text Warnungsschrift an die zu frankfurt am 
main, sich vor Zwinglischer lehre zu hüten, Pieper continues, “there is only a short step from the concept 
of implicit faith to luther’s derogatory term, ‘blind faith’ [Köhlerglaube, literally: the charcoal burner’s 
faith]. Thus when the charcoal burner [Köhler] on the bridge to Prague responded to a doctor of 
divinity who asked him what he believed by saying that he believed what the church believes, it seems 
to me that this much-maligned man’s answer is not at all something ridiculous and despicable, but 
rather something exceptionally wise, apt, and accurate—and as already mentioned, it is something 
taken as perfectly natural everywhere else. in my opinion, if i were to be asked about the structure 
of the universe or of matter, i would respond by referring to modern physics: i may only have a vague 
knowledge of its results, but (in a way that may be difficult to define precisely) I nevertheless truly 
participate in these results because i am allying myself with men like Planck, Bohr, de Broglie, and 
heisenberg” (Pieper 1962, pp. 101f.).
40  Johann wolfgang von goethe, faust i, verse 382f.: “dass ich erkenne, was die welt im 
innersten zusammenhält.”
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